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The essence of rage: Galen on emotional 
disturbances and their physical correlates
1
 
 
As is well known, Galen makes a strong claim about the dependence of the 
soul upon bodily mixtures, and gives a detailed account of the  capacities of 
the soul understood in their physiological function, located in specific organs 
in the body. He does those two things in two of his most philosophically 
interesting and better-known writings - Quod animi mores and De placitis 
Hippocratis et Platonis - and amongst Galen's works it is these that have 
attracted probably the most scholarly attention and philosophical analysis in 
recent years. 
In the present paper I aim to explore the related area of how, for Galen, 
emotional states - the soul's affections, or pathē - are connected with bodily 
states. I shall be doing this largely on the basis of texts which are much less 
well studied - even amongst Galen scholars - than those just mentioned, and 
in particular ones which are not overtly works of 'psychology' or soul theory at 
all. In the process I shall be focussing on one particular group of common, we 
might say everyday, mental or emotional disturbances which Galen 
discusses, in some detail, in relation to their physical correlates. It is, indeed, 
striking that most of the detailed material that Galen offers in this area - most 
of the discussion of this particular set of disturbances - appears, not in his 
specific work on the affections of the soul, Aff. Pecc. Dig., nor in the other 
most obviously psychological works, PHP or QAM, but in a range of more 
general, medical works on disease, health and diagnosis.2  
                                                        
1
 I should like to express my gratitude to the organizers of the conference held in honour of 
Chris Gill at Exeter in July 2013 for the invitation to participate; and to the other participants at 
the conference for their valuable contributions in the discussion of this paper. I am particularly 
grateful to Heinrich von Staden, as well as to David Sedley, for extremely helpful remarks. I 
must also acknowledge the generous support of the Wellcome Trust, which funded the 
project 'Towards a Galen in English', in the course of which this paper was written. 
2
 Recent work on Galen's 'psychology' or soul theory has been voluminous, and of a high 
level of scholarly and philosophical sophistication; it has, however, tended to focus almost 
exclusively on Galen's works of 'philosophical psychology', largely ignoring  the much larger 
corpus of his medical ones. To the three mentioned so far, PHP, Aff. Pecc. Dig. and QAM, 
one may, in this context, add the De moribus, a work preserved only in an Arabic summary, 
and the recently-discovered De indolentia. Prominent among such philosophical studies are: 
García Ballester (1972), Donini (1974), (1980), (1988), (1992), (2008); Manuli and Vegetti 
(1977), as well as the papers assembled in Manuli and Vegetti (1988); Vegetti (1984), 
(1999a), (1999b); Manuli (1986), (1993), Lloyd (1988), Hankinson (1991a), (1991b), (1992), 
(1993), (2006); Singer (1992), (1996); Tieleman (1996), (2003); Gill (1998), (2007); Bazou 
(1999); van der Eijk (2009); Jouanna (2009); Rosen (2009); Schiefsky (2012). And a 
particular advance in philosophical analysis of the works mentioned above was represented 
by the monographic study of Galen's psychology in its philosophical context by the honorand 
of the present volume: Gill (2010).     See now Singer (2013), 
both for discussion of De indolentia (as well as further bibliography on it), and for detailed 
analysis of and commentary on all the works mentioned above, except for PHP.  
   
 It is true that philosophical analysis has sometimes included such texts as De usu 
partium, De temperamentis, De foetuum formatione, De semine; but even these are works 
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The essence of rage 
In a passage in his great work on health, Galen makes the following 
statement about rage (thumos): 
'Now, rage is not simply an increase, but as it were a kind of boiling of the hot 
in the heart; which is why the most reputable philosophers state that this is its 
essence; for the appetite for revenge is an incidental feature, and not the 
essence, of rage.'  
ὁ μέν γε θυμὸς οὐδ᾽ἁπλῶς αὔξησις, ἀλλ᾽οἷον ζέσις τίς ἐστι τοῦ κατὰ τὴν 
καρδίαν θερμοῦ - διὸ καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ τῶν φιλοσόφων οἱ δοκιμώτατοι 
τοιαύτην εἶναι φασι - συμβεβηκὸς γάρ τι καὶ οὐκ οὐσία τοῦ θυμοῦ ἐστιν ἡ τῆς 
ἀντιτιμωρήσεως ὄρεξις. 
  (San. Tu. II.9, 61,24-8 Koch, VI.138 Kühn; translations are my 
own unless otherwise stated) 
The statement here that 'the boiling of the hot in the heart is the essence of 
rage' raises a number of questions. Among them: who are 'the most reputable 
philosophers' to whom Galen attributes this view; and, conversely, who are 
the polemical targets of the latter part of the sentence - those who, by 
implication, believe, rather, that 'appetite for revenge' is the essence of 
thumos?  
But, more fundamentally, what is at stake in the claim itself: that 'the boiling of 
the hot in the heart', and not 'appetite for revenge', is the essence of rage?   
From a modern philosophical point of view, Galen seems here to be taking a 
stand on a substantive issue in the philosophy of mind, regarding mental 
states. Mental states, Galen appears to be saying, must be defined in terms of 
their physical features, rather than experiential or intentional ones. 
Clarification of the precise nature of this claim will be of considerable interest, 
both in terms of the philosophical analysis of a particular ancient view in the 
philosophy of mind and in terms of its ramifications in Galen's own medical 
and psychological thought. The view in question looks like a reductivist one; 
we might, further, be tempted to consider whether, in modern philosophical 
terms, it represents some kind of type identity theory, or a variety of 
epiphenomenalism or supervenience theory. 
                                                                                                                                                              
largely devoted to physical or physiological theory, rather than to the clinical or diagnostic 
context. An important step in the study of a wider range of texts was made by Paola Manuli 
(1988), as further discussed below; and one should make particular mention of the work of 
Heinrich von Staden (e.g. 2000, 2011) as extending the range of Galenic texts studied 
beyond the realm of the purely philosophical: the latter article indeed is especially relevant to 
the theme of the present paper. There has also recently been some more wide-ranging work 
on Galen's discussions of mental illness: as well as the case studies assembled in Mattern 
(2008), see Boudon-Millot (2013), Holmes (2013) and Jouanna (2013), and now especially 
Devinant (forthcoming) and Singer (forthcoming). 
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But let us look at both the language of the claim, and its immediate context, 
more closely. 
Galen is using terminology which is, at least at some remove, Aristotelian. 
The term ousia is used very widely in Galen, and there is a range of 
meanings. He quite frequently uses the term to refer to various kinds of 
physical matter in the body - 'substance' in something like the modern 
everyday English sense, rather than any Aristotelian one.3 But, fairly clearly, 
this is not the relevant sense here. Here, the sense seems similar to that 
which one finds in other logical or analytical contexts. 
'… one should find the fitting and appropriate premises in the actual essence 
of the matter under enquiry … when Chrysippus considers the subject of the 
leading part of the soul, we should state the account of the essence of the 
matter we are enquiring about, and use this as a yardstick and aim in all the 
individual [arguments].' 
... ἀπ᾽αὐτῆς χρὴ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ ζητουμένου πράγματος ἐξευρίσκειν τὰ 
προσήκοντά τε καὶ οἰκεῖα λήμματα ... ἐν οἷς Χρύσιππος ἐπισκοπεῖται περὶ τοῦ 
τῆς ψυχῆς ἡγεμονικοῦ τὸν τῆς οὐσίας λόγον εἰπόντας ὑπὲρ οὗ ζητοῦμεν 
πράγματος ἐκείνῳ χρῆσθαι κανόνι τε καὶ σκοπῷ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἁπάντων.  
   (PHP II.3, 108,27-31 De Lacy, V.219 Kühn) 
  
'You may perhaps think that the examination that I am recommending is a 
long one; but at least it is truthful, above all things, taken as it is from the very 
essence  of the subject under enquiry, as discussed in my work on 
Demonstration.'  
μακρὰν ἴσως σοι δόξω λέγειν τὴν ἐξέτασιν ἀλλ᾽ἀληθῆ γε παντὸς μᾶλλον ἐξ 
αὐτῆς τε τοῦ ζητουμένου τῆς οὐσίας λαμβανομένην, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ὑπὲρ 
ἀποδείξεως ἐλέγετο.  
    (Temp. II.2, 53,4-7 Helmreich, I.592-3 Kühn) 
 
These two passages, I think, make fairly clear what is meant by ousia. One 
could, to be sure, add further relevant ones: one might consider, for example, 
a passage in QAM 2 which links the ousia of something inextricably with its 
                                                        
3
 Many examples could be provided; I give just four for the sake of exemplification: the 
underlying substance for the regenerative process (ἡ ... ὑποβεβλημένη πρὸς τὴν γένεσιν ... 
οὐσία) is menstrual blood, De semine II.2, 162,20 De Lacy, IV.611-12 Kühn; sometimes 
bodies depart from their natural state only in terms of the four qualities, with no other 
substance coming in from outside (μηδεμίας ἔξωθεν ... ἐπιρρυείσης ἑτέρας οὐσίας), Caus. 
Morb. 6, VII.21 Kühn; one particular kind of increase in the internal heat arises through the 
airy substance (ἀερώδης οὐσίας) alone having been heated, Diff. Feb. I.1, VII.276 Kühn; 
mixtures are responsible for bringing about the specific susbtance of the parts (τὴν ἰδίαν 
οὐσίαν τῶν μορίων συμπληροῦσιν) in human or animal bodies, De usu partium I.9, i.18,25 
Helmreich, III.26 Kühn. 
 4 
capacities (dunameis) and activities (energeiai),4 or one at the beginning of 
Diff. Feb. which asserts the importance of making the distinctions between 
different types of fever according to their ousia, rather than according to 
sumbebēkos.5 
To talk of something's ousia, in the relevant sense, is for Galen to talk of the 
essential nature of that thing, or of what it is according to its true definition. 
And ousia, essence, in this sense (e.g. in the Diff. Feb. text just mentioned) is 
crucially distinguished from sumbebēkos, which we might provisionally 
translate 'non-essential property' (but more on this below). 
Now, the reference to Aristotle is relevant to the first question I raised above, 
the identity of 'the most reputable philosophers'. It seems, on the basis of 
fairly clear verbal echoes (as I have argued elsewhere6), that this is in fact a 
reference, however indirect, to Aristotle, and to what Galen takes to be his 
view in the well-known passage of book I of the De anima about the 
relationship between the different accounts which a phusikos, or student of 
nature, and a dialectician will give of the affections of the soul. 
'So a phusikos and a dialectician would define each of them [sc. the affections 
of the soul], such as what anger is, differently: the latter [would define it as] 
the appetite for retaliation, or something of that sort, while the former would 
define it as the boiling of blood or of the hot around the heart. Of these, the 
one gives the matter, the other the form and rationale [or definitional account]. 
For the rationale is the form of the thing, and this must be [realized] in a 
certain kind of matter, if it is to be ...' 
διαφερόντως δ᾽ἂν ὁρίσαιντο φυσικός τε καὶ διαλεκτικὸς ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, οἷον 
ὀργὴ τί ἐστίν – ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὄρεξιν ἀντιλυπήσεως ἤ τι τοιοῦτον, ὁ δὲ ζέσιν τοῦ 
περὶ καρδίαν αἵματος καὶ θερμοῦ. τούτων δὲ ὁ μὲν τὴν ὕλην ἀποδίδωσιν, ὁ δὲ 
τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸν λόγον. ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος ὅδε τοῦ πράγματος, ἀνάγκη δ᾽εἶναι 
τοῦτον ἐν ὕλῃ τοιᾳδί, εἰ ἔσται ...      (De anima I.1, 403a29-
403b2) 
  
If that is the case, it would also seem to be the case that Galen 
misremembers, distorts or - to put it at its weakest - strongly interprets the 
passage. Aristotle presents the 'appetite-for-revenge' definition, that of the 
dialectician, as corresponding to the form and logos of the emotion, and the 
'boiling-of-the-hot' definition, that of the phusikos, as corresponding to its 
matter. Though the terminology of ousia is not used at this point, the 
Aristotelian talk in terms of eidos and logos seems to bring us close to what 
Galen would mean by ousia: it would seem to be the dialectician, here, who 
has the more central, or definitional, account. To the extent, then, that 
Aristotle's conception of the 'form/logos' account may be assimilated to 
Galen's conception of the account in terms of ousia, Galen has in effect 
                                                        
4
 QAM 2, 33,4-16 Müller, IV.768-9 Kühn (the passage is admittedly not textually 
unproblematic; see now Singer (2013) ad loc. for discussion). 
5
 Diff. Feb. I.1, VII.273 Kühn. 
6
 Singer (2014): 27-29. 
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reversed the terms of Aristotle's dichotomy, equating the material explanation 
with this dialectician's 'form/logos' account rather than with that of the 
phusikos.  
It is, moreover, an important feature of Aristotle's discussion, in the passage 
closely following that cited here (403b7-9), that both the matter and the logos 
are needed for a full account; and this perception is lost in Galen's version.  
I am not, however, directly concerned here with Galen's relationship with 
Aristotle, let alone with the correct interpretation of Aristotle's theory of the 
soul in relation to the body. The latter is, of course, a notoriously difficult 
question, and one which has attracted far more philosophical discussion than 
the equivalent question for Galen.7 
We are here seeking to shed light on Galen's own intellectual framework. 
Returning to the passage from De sanitate tuenda: we have so far clarified 
that by the 'ousia' of rage, he means what rage is in its proper definition, or 
what it most fundamentally is. The further implications of this view of rage 
remain to be examined.  
Now, this must depend partly on how we understand the term opposed to 
ousia, that is sumbebēkos. Again, the heritage of the term is undeniably 
Aristotelian. There is, however, here too, a range of possible usages. 
Although the broad thrust of an ousia-sumbebēkos opposition is clear - the 
former will correspond to something in some sense prior and central, the latter 
to something in some sense subsidiary - the question, in what senses, 
precisely, remains to be determined. What, exactly, does Galen mean by 
describing the 'intentional' definition of rage (appetite for revenge) as a 
sumbebēkos?  
Within Aristotle and Aristotelian writing, sumbebēkos refers to an incidental 
property of a thing: something, to summarize, which either does not belong to 
that thing in virtue of its true nature, is not essential to its definition, or is not 
its relevant feature in relation to a particular argument. It is, in some cases at 
least, explicitly stated that a sumbebēkos is something not necessary - 
something which may or may not be present. There is, further, a distinction 
between things which are sumbebēkota and which are kath' hauta, in 
themselves. And something's sumbebēkota, as well as its pathē, are things 
which a demonstration may show (rather than legitimate starting-points of a 
demonstration).8 On the other hand, there seems to be a distinction within the 
category of sumbebēkota, and at points an association of the notion of 
                                                        
7
 A very selective, but high-level, representation of recent discussions would be that provided 
by the following essay collections: Barnes, Schofield and Sorabji (1979), Durrant (1993); 
Everson (1991); Nussbaum and Rorty (1995). More specific attention is paid to Aristotle's 
biological works and their contribution to this debate in, e.g.: Nussbaum (1978), Gotthelf and 
Lennox (1987), van der Eijk (2000). 
8
 See e.g. Po I.21, 83a4-9 (the whiteness of a particular piece of wood, which is not a 
necessary property of the wood); ibid. I.4, 73b3-4 (the distinction between καθ᾽αὑτά and 
συμβεβηκότα); ibid. I.6, 74b12 (τὰ ... συμβεβηκότα οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα); ibid. I.7, 75a42-b2 
(sumbebēkota as points shown by a demonstration). 
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sumbebēkos with something 'specific' or 'proper' (idion) to a subject.9 The use 
of the term sumbebēkos in conjunction with idiai, perhaps significantly, seems 
to have its closest Aristotelian parallel, again, in the De anima. In a discussion 
of method, it is stated that one might think there to be:  
 μία τις ... μέθοδος κατὰ πάντων ὧν βουλόμεθα γνῶναι τὴν  οὐσίαν, 
ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἰδίων ἀπόδειξις.  
        (I.1, 402a13-15) 
The notion of the 'specifically incidental', or 'specific attribute' (Ross has 
'consequential attributes') as closely associated with, though distinct from, 
ousia, as well as the idea that there can be demonstration in this area, is, as 
we shall see, closely paralleled in Galen's writings. 
Moving outside the Aristotelian corpus, furthermore, we find that the term 
sumbebēkos in later Greek philosophical writing seems to acquire a much 
more general sense of 'attribute'; and, relatedly, that it can be taken as the 
starting-point for a demonstration; and this broader usage has undoubtedly 
been influential on Galen.  
What Galen means by sumbebēkos in the De sanitate tuenda passage, in 
fact, seems to be clarified by another passage from PHP. In his presentation 
of the arguments about the location of soul-capacities in that work - the 
rational in the brain, the spirited in the heart and the desiderative in the liver - 
Galen, as we have already seen, asserts the importance of starting one's 
demonstration from the ousia of the subject in question. But, when it comes to 
the third part of the soul, he admits that the argument cannot proceed in quite 
the same way.  
' ... we stated in advance that the demonstration would not be from equally 
manifest things nor directly from the nature of the thing under enquiry ... but 
from its specific properties.' 
... προειπόντες ὡς οὐκ ἐξ ὁμοίως ἐναργῶν οὐδ᾽ἐξ αὐτῆς ἀντικρὺς τοῦ 
ζητουμένου τῆς φύσεως ἡ ἀπόδειξις ... ἀλλ᾽ἐκ τῶν τούτῷ συμβεβηκότων ἰδίᾳ.  
    
   (PHP VI.3, 372,19-22 De Lacy, V.519 Kühn) 
 
The term sumbebēkota seems here to require translation as 'properties' rather 
than as 'incidental properties', and indeed these are properties specific (idiai) 
to the thing in question, so it is not the case that they are incidental in the 
sense of their presence or absence being a matter of indifference. What 
Galen has in mind here with the term sumbebēkota is the properties of the 
liver and veins; arguments about these - which proceed on the basis of an 
                                                        
9
 Po. I.22, 83b19-20 (some sumbebēkota are kath' hauta, some in a different way); cf. ibid. 
I.7, 75a42-b2 and ibid. I.6, 75a20-22, the latter also implying two different kinds of 
sumbebēkos; the text at Prior. I.31, 46b26-27 has the terms sumbebēkos and idion in parallel, 
and cf. the use of idia at ibid. I.27, 43b1-5. 
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analogy with plants, and of observed anatomical structures - are not based in 
the ousia of the subject being investigated, that is the desiderative soul, 
because we are not observing anything which could be expressed directly as 
a statement about the desiderative soul itself; but we are observing something 
about the anatomical features which, Galen hopes to persuade us, are 
intimately associated with it. So the term sumbebēkos here - coupled with idiai 
- seems to refer to something which always accompanies the ousia in 
question, something, indeed, which provides the basis for a substitute 
argument when arguments from ousia are not available. 
This sense of sumbebēkota, in conjunction with some form of the word idios, 
to indicate something which is not itself the ousia of an object, but is in some 
indissociable way related to it, has parallels elsewhere in Galen too. For 
example, in chapter 4 of the Ars medica, Galen is talking about healthy bodies 
and the diagnōsis - recognition or distinguishing - of them. A twofold 
distinction arises: 
 'One must carry out the diagnōseis of them on the basis of [a] 
 things which belong to them in virtue of their fundamental  ousia, 
and [b] the activities and symptoms which necessarily  follow upon 
these - things which, indeed, we call 'specific  properties.' 
 τὰς διαγνώσεις δὲ αὐτῶν ἀπό τε τῶν ὑπαρχόντων κατὰ τὸν  τῆς 
οὐσίας αὐτῶν λόγον χρὴ ποιεῖσθαι, καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης  τούτοις 
ἑπομένων ἐνεργειῶν τε καὶ συμπτωμάτων, ἃ δὴ καὶ  συμβεβηκότα καλοῦμεν 
ἰδίως.     
   (Ars medica 4, 282,18-283,3 Boudon, I.314 Kühn) 
It is further clarified that what is understood under [a] is the best balance of 
the homogeneous parts in terms of hot, cold, dry and wet, as well as (at the 
higher level) the appropriate structural excellences of the organic parts; while 
what is understood under [b], that is the sumbebēkota idiōs, are: at the lower 
level, the properties discernible by touch and sight and, at the higher, the 
overall balance and beauty of the bodily organs; at both levels, too, included 
under this latter heading are the excellences of the relevant activities. Here, 
then, properties, including activities, which follow of necessity from a particular 
ousia are described as sumbebēkota idiōs.10 
A text from De sanitate tuenda further supports this understanding of 
sumbebēkota: 
'For the study of health (as also that of therapy) consists in these three 
classes primarily: bodies, causes and signs: the bodies are the actual healthy 
bodies ... the signs are those incidental to them [or those which are properties 
of them], from which they are discerned; the causes are those by which the 
safe-guarding of health comes about.'  
ἐν τρισὶ γὰρ τούτοις γένεσι πρώτοις ἐστὶν ἡ ὑγιεινὴ πραγματεία, καθάπερ καὶ ἡ 
θεραπευτική, σώμασί τε καὶ αἰτίοις καὶ σημείοις, σώμασι μὲν αὐτοῖς τοῖς 
                                                        
10
 Cf. also a somewhat similar usage, distinguising the investigation of an organ's structure 
from that of the ἴδια συμβεβηκότα of its activity, at De instrumento odoratus 3, II.863 Kühn. 
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ὑγιαίνουσιν ... σημείοις δὲ τοῖς συμβεβηκόσιν αὐτοῖς, ἐξ ὧν διαγινώσκεται, 
αἰτίοις δέ, ὑφ᾽ὧν ἡ φυλακὴ τῆς ὑγείας γίνεται.   
    (San. Tu. I.13, 36,3-7 Koch, VI.78 Kühn)   
Again, sumbebēkota are intimately connected with the phenomenon in 
question, in this case bodies and their health - so intimately connected, in fact, 
that one can use the sumbebēkos as a sign (sēmeion) by which that state of 
health can be discerned (even though, in this particular case, the terminology 
of idios is not employed). 
Turning back to our original De sanitate tuenda text, we are, I think, now a 
position to rule out one thing that Galen might have meant by saying that 
appetite for revenge was sumbebēkos. The argument could, on one 
interpretation of sumbebēkos, have been taken to mean that one can be in a 
rage without having the mental experience of appetite for revenge. And such 
a view could then have had the further implications, (1) that 'appetite for 
revenge' is too narrow, or too vague a description, since the single item 'rage' 
(which, we must understand, is defined in terms of physical phenomena in the 
body) may be accompanied by a range of different descriptions of personal 
experience; or even (more strongly) (2) that one may, in fact, be in a rage 
without knowing it, or while thinking that one is in the grip of some other 
pathos. Since its fundamental description is a physical one, it might happen to 
be the case that all the usual physical features were present in a person, but 
that that person did not feel that she or he was in a rage; in such a case, that 
condition would still be correctly defined as rage. The medical expert, but not 
necessarily the subject, will be the authority on when rage is taking place. 
Now, I do not think that Galen is in fact making either of these claims. (He 
does, as we shall see later, discuss the possibility of being wrong about 
emotions - but only about other people's emotions.) 
To the contrary, in fact, Galen seems very clearly, in the passages which we 
have just considered, to regard this kind of sumbebēkos as indissociable 
from, or inevitably following upon, the item to which it is related (Ross's 
'consequential attribute'). In the last case cited, in fact, the participle is used 
adjectivally rather than substantivally, and refers to sēmeia, 'signs'; the 
implication, though, is that a relationship of sufficient regularity is involved in 
this sumbainein on the part of the sēmeia, that they can, indeed, be used as 
signs of what is happening in the bodies. In the PHP text, the indissociability 
of sumbebēkota of this kind from the ousia to which they attach is such that 
these sumbebēkota can be used in a demonstration concerning that ousia 
(albeit not a demonstration of the most reliable kind); and in that from Ars 
medica the relationship is one of 'following of necessity'. 
This, though, has hardly solved the puzzle inherent in Galen's peculiar form of 
expression. If he agrees that the 'appetite for revenge' will, in fact, always be 
present in cases of rage, what is at stake in claiming that this is an attribute or 
property, and not the essence, of rage? 
Certainly he is asserting the priority of the physical description of rage. And 
doubtless, too, his statement here can be seen as belonging within the 
 9 
rhetorical framework which insists on the priority of the doctor's knowledge of 
what happens in the human being - including within the human being's soul.  
Is Galen then claiming causal priority for the physical account (as one might 
think, for example, on the basis of the above Ars medica text)? In this case, 
we might characterize his philosophical position as a reductivist physicalist 
one, and probably indeed as a version of epiphenomenalism: the 'appetite for 
revenge' is then the epiphenomenon, but all that is happening in body and 
soul can be causally accounted for in physical terms. 
Before deciding this, we need to look further, in particular at the nature of the 
causal claims that are being made with regard to rage and its physical 
correlates. (We shall then return again once more to consider the question of 
Galen's relationship with modern positions in the philosophy of mind, below 
under 'Reciprocal soul-body relations'.) 
 
Physical correlates of a range of soul affections 
In order to gain some clarity as to what is the nature, and importance to 
Galen, of his assertion of the priority of the physical description of the pathos, 
let us look, first at the broader context of the statement with which we started, 
and then at some other relevant texts from elsewhere in the Corpus.  
Our first text appears in a treatise devoted to provisions for the maintenance 
of health. Within that, the rather distant starting-point that leads into this 
passage is a discussion of exercise. Proceeding from that general area, via a 
classification of the different possible forms of increase of the innate heat, 
Galen finds himself (albeit briefly) characterizing the physical differences that 
arise in soul-affections. This, then, is the context: different forms of increase of 
the innate heat. Alongside thumos, he identifies two other soul-affections, 
agōnia and aidōs. These also involve increase in heat, but the specific 
manifestations are different in each case (although there is quite a close 
similarity between the physical manifestations in the latter two, shame and 
anxiety). 
'And this [sc. an increase in innate heat] is common to all exercises; but it is 
not specific to them, since, indeed, an increase in innate hotness arises also 
in those experiencing rage, anxiety and shame. Now, rage is not simply an 
increase, but as it were a kind of boiling of the hot in the heart; which is why 
the best-reputed philosophers state that this is its essence; for the appetite for 
revenge is an incidental feature, and not the essence, of the rage. The 
internal heat increases in those suffering shame too, as all of the hot courses 
together to the inside, and then gathers deep down, and then increases both 
because of that gathering and because of the constant motion. For the breath 
is not at rest in people in a state of shame, but is stirred about all over the 
place both inside and about itself, just as it is in people in a state of anxiety.' 
καὶ τοῦτο κοινὸν μὲν ἁπάντων τῶν γυμνασίων, οὐ μήν γε ἴδιόν ἐστιν, εἴ γε δὴ 
τοῖς θυμωθεῖσι καὶ τοῖς ἀγωνιάσασι καὶ τοῖς αἰδεσθεῖσιν αὔξησις τῆς ἐμφύτου 
γίνεται θερμότητος. ὁ μέν γε θυμὸς οὐδ᾽ἁπλῶς αὔξησις, ἀλλ᾽οἷον ζέσις τίς ἐστι 
 10 
τοῦ κατὰ τὴν καρδίαν θερμοῦ · διὸ καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ τῶν φιλοσόφων οἱ 
δοκιμώτατοι τοιαύτην εἶναί φασι · συμβεβηκὸς γάρ τι καὶ οὐκ οὐσία τοῦ 
θερμοῦ ἐστιν ἡ τῆς ἀντιτιμωρήσεως ὄρεξις. αὐξάνεται δὲ καὶ τοῖς αἰδεσθεῖσιν ἡ 
ἔμφυτος θερμότης, εἴσω μὲν τὰ πρῶτα συνδράμοντος ἅπαντος τοῦ θερμοῦ, 
μετὰ ταῦτα δ᾽ἀθροισθέντος ἐν τῷ βάθει, κἄπειτα αὐξηθέντος καὶ διὰ τὴν 
ἄθροισιν μὲν τὴν ἐνταῦθα καὶ διὰ τὴν κίνησιν δὲ τὴν συνεχῆ. οὐ γὰρ ἡσυχάζει 
τὸ πνεῦμα τῶν αἰδουμένων, ἀλλ᾽ἔνδον τε καὶ περὶ αὑτὸ μετὰ τοῦ σύμπαντος 
αἵματος κυκᾶται πολυειδῶς, ὥσπερ γε καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀγωνιώντων. 
    (San. Tu. II.9, 61,21-34 Koch, VI.138-139 Kühn)  
 
So, we now have two more soul-affections, and again an insistence on the 
particularity of their physical differentiae.  
Galen tells us that he will say some more about 'all such affections of the soul' 
later in the work; and he does, in book IV. 
'And this happens to them because of cold, trembling, or an affection of the 
soul, such as fear, violent distress or incipient shame; if none of these is 
present, the humours would never retreat back to the depth; similarly, the 
humours would never burn the skin by rushing towards it violently unless the 
soul were undergoing some affection, or an immoderate warmth were 
befalling the animal from outside. With people who have become violently 
angry or enraged, therefore, or when they are presenting the back-flow, as it 
were, of humours from shame, do not pay attention to the colour ...'  
συμβαίνει δ᾽αὐτοῖς τοῦτο διὰ κρύος ἢ ῥῖγος ἢ πάθος ψυχῆς, οἷον φόβον ἢ 
λύπην ἰσχυρὰν ἢ ἀρχομένην αἰδώ · μηδενὸς δὲ τούτων παρόντος, οὐκ ἄν 
ποθ᾽ὑπονοστήσειαν εἰς τὸ βάθος οἱ χυμοί, ὥσπερ οὐδ᾽ἐπικαύσαιεν ἄν ποτε τὸ 
δέρμα βιαιότερον ὁρμήσαντες ἐπ᾽αὐτὸ χωρὶς τοῦ παθεῖν τι τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ 
θάλπος ἄμετρον ἔξωθεν περιστῆναι τῷ ζῴῳ. ὀργισθέντων οὖν ποτ᾽ἰσχυρῶς ἢ 
θυμωθέντων ἢ τὴν ἐκ τῆς αἰδοῦς οἷον ἄμπωτιν τῶν χυμῶν ἀναφερόντων, μὴ 
προσεχεῖν τὸν νοῦν τῇ χροιᾷ ... 
   (San. Tu. IV.4, 112,6-13 Koch, VI.253-254 Kühn) 
 
Here the context is the possibility of using the phenomena externally visible in 
a person, in particular colour, as indicators of the underlying disposition; but 
certain cases where the humours 'retreat into the depth' of the body will 
confuse this picture.  
A picture is emerging of the physiology of mental or emotional disturbances - 
or at least of a particular distinct set them - and of their relationship with heat 
in the body; and this picture is elaborated considerably elsewhere.  
Before proceeding to that elaboration, it is perhaps worth mentioning another 
question, albeit only to clarify that I am leaving it to one side in the present 
enquiry, namely that of the origins or intellectual forebears of Galen's thought 
in this area. There are, it seems, parallels for some of his statements about 
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the motion of blood within the body in relation to emotions, in the Aristotelian 
tradition.11 This point -related as it is to the diverse origins of different 
elements of Galen's intellectual framework - is, indeed, worth bearing in mind 
later on in our discussion, when we come to the question of the co-existence 
of different 'models' of the soul in Galen. For the moment, however, the 
specifics of that question of origins must be left for further research. 
The fullest account, overlapping with those we have already seen but adding 
considerable detail, appears in book II of De causis symptomatum. The 
passage is of central relevance to our argument here; in view of its length, it is 
presented below as an appendix, while a discussion which aims to highlight 
the essential points follows here. 
At the point where this passage begins, Galen has been discussing violent 
trembling, or 'rigor', and the way in which this is related to humoral 
phenomena, and in particular to heating and cooling, in different parts of the 
body. He introduces what follows as a continuation of the account of 
pathology in this particular area, and of its causes. 
To summarize: fear draws the pneuma, or breath, and the blood inward, 
causing cooling on the surface, while rage involves an opposite, outward 
motion. Anxiety (agōnia) involves a mixture of both these motions. Shame 
(aidōs) involves first an inward motion, then a sudden return to the surface. 
Distress (lupē) has the same physical manifestations as fear, but on a smaller 
scale. The above physiological processes which accompany fear can in 
extreme cases be fatal; and joy shares some of the same physical 
characteristics as fear, involving a dissipation of tension, and so can in 
extreme cases lead to sudden death in a similar way. Pain presents some of 
the same symptoms as very great fear. 
We have, then, a remarkably detailed account of a number of distinct emotive 
experiences - fear, rage, anxiety, shame, distress, joy, pain: each has precise 
physical correlates, understood in terms of very specific phenomena of heat in 
the body.12 
                                                        
11
 One may, for example, point to somewhat similar accounts of shame and fear in the 
Aristotelian Problems: the physical correlates of agōnia, phobos and thumos are 
distinguished in terms of heat and its location and/or motion at II.6, 869a2-8; II.31, 869b7-9; 
XI.32, 902b37-903a4 (mentioning also aischunē) and XI.53, 905a6-13 (distinguishing 
aidōs/agōnia and phobos); thumos and phobos are contrasted in terms of upward or 
downward motion of the blood/heat at XXVII.3, 947b24-34, with which cf. XXXI.3, 957b9-14 
and XXXII.8, 961a8-13 (contrasting the motions of heat in anger and shame). 
 This consideration also raises a broader point. In assessing Galen's relationship with 
the Aristotelian tradition, it is not just his contact with and reaction to the earliest generation of 
texts that must be considered. Authors closer to Galen's own time, e.g. Philo of Alexandria 
(and that location, with its medical connections, might possibly be of particular significance for 
Galen), may shed light on the way in which the tradition has been interpreted between 
Aristotle (and indeed Plato) and Galen. I am grateful to the anonymous referee for pointing to 
the possible significance of Philo; future research on Philo and others in the Platonic-
Aristotelian tradition may indeed shed further light on Galen's intellectual formation (cf. on this 
point also Singer 2014). 
12
 These English translations can of course only represent approximations to the values of 
these terms in the Greek socio-linguistic tradition; but it is hoped that they are at least not 
grossly misleading. The concept of aidōs is, as is well known, linked to a complex of Graeco-
 12 
From this text it is even clearer that Galen is keen to demonstrate his ability to 
analyse the soul affections in physical terms: that he is, in some sense, 
asserting the priority of the physical account. But in what sense, exactly?  
We considered one possibility already, and found it improbable: that Galen 
actually regards the experiential or intentional content of a mental state as a 
dispensable aspect of the description, i.e. that we might be experiencing 
anger without the intentional content which a traditional philosophical 
description has attributed to it: the desire for revenge.  
It would in principle be possible to explore other possibilities, too, for example 
that Galen accepts the validity of an experiential or mental account of rage, 
but believes that this should take a simpler form, characterising rather a 'raw' 
emotional state, without the specific intentional content that the traditional 
philosophical definition entails. In other words, rage has a legitimate 
experiential as well as physical definition; but the specific one, 'appetite for 
revenge', is not it. (And in that case, then presumably similar arguments might 
apply in the case of shame, fear, etc.) Now, as I have already argued, I do not 
believe that this is in fact the sense of his characterization of 'appetite for 
revenge' as a mere sumbebēkos. But certainly, if that were the thrust of his 
approach, he does not give us enough to go on to develop it meaningfully.  
What seems to be the case, indeed, is that Galen does not reject traditional, 
experiential accounts of mental states like agōnia, thumos, phobos. He 
mentions a particular intentional account of rage, as we have seen; and, in the 
passage just considered, one of shame, which may also be traditional ('the 
soul-capacity cannot endure the society of a much greater person').13 But 
Galen is not problematizing this: it does not seem that he thinks that there will 
be any difficulty knowing when something is a case of fear, shame, anxiety, 
and so on.  
Another possibility, as already suggested above, is that he asserts the 
importance of the physical correlates because he thinks the physical 
phenomena are causally prior. In this case, we would might [???}- if again we 
are looking for equivalents in the modern philosophy of mind - of an analysis 
in terms of epiphenomenalism.  
But again, this does not seem to be what Galen is saying. The causes of an 
occurrence of shame, fear, anxiety mentioned by Galen are the obvious, 
everyday ones - the presence of a particular person, a threatening event. 
These are not presented to us as the results of a physical process of 
causation. One can, to be sure, look at the underlying causes of one person's 
                                                                                                                                                              
Roman societal notions to do with appropriate publicly viewed behaviour, and how one is 
scrutinized and valued. Terms which may seem more problematic in translation are lupē, 
which apart from a more or less technical sense in the philosophical tradition may also refer 
more straightforwardly to 'pain'. (On both these features of lupē see further below; but the 
straightforward sense of 'pain' is certainly not the central one in present contexts, this being 
covered rather by ponos or algēma.) 'Anxiety' seems the best translation of agōnia, with the 
proviso that a sense associated with public performance or competition is often - though not 
always - to the fore. 
13
 μὴ φερούσης ἀνθρώπου πολὺ κρείττονος ὁμιλίαν, Caus. Symp. II.5, VII.192 Kühn; for this 
and the phrases cited in the following paragraphs, see Appendix 1 below. 
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being more fearful, angry, or inclined to shame than another, and some of 
these might be understood as physical causes, along the lines further 
discussed for example in QAM. But such a causal framework is not explored 
at this point, in his discussion of disease aetiology and the relationship of 
symptoms to their underlying causes. The closest he here gets to 
consideration of such predisposing causes are expressions like the 'inborn 
softness and timidity' that lead to shame, or the 'naturally weak little soul' or 
'small-souled' nature that lead to the risk of sudden death from fear and joy 
respectively: terms which are vague in relation to any possible physical 
account of those natures. 
 
Emotional disturbance as cause of physical disease 
What is striking, in fact, is the extent to which the set of psychological 
affections that we have seen above recurs in Galen as causes of physical 
events, rather than as effects of them. Specifically, they are mentioned 
frequently in accounts of the aetiology of diseases.  
Examples of this causative role - both a more generic role in changing bodily 
mixture, especially by heating or drying, and a more specific one in the 
genesis of fever - proliferate over the Galenic corpus. Typically, they occur in 
lists which include also more obviously physical causes. There are quite a lot 
of relevant texts here; again, the most relevant passages are quoted in 
extenso in an Appendix 2, and summarized below according to the subheads 
of that appendix. (There is, however, considerable overlap between the topics 
here, and the effects described can be understood within a single framework, 
according to the effects of hot, cold, wet and dry.) 
 
A variety of descriptions of the physical effects of emotional disturbance 
In Appendix 2 (A), a text from De sanitate tuenda, cases of rage, worry and 
distress (thumoi, phrontides, lupai) appear, alongside baths, in a fairly general 
mention of things that affect mixture. 
Appendix 2 (B), also from De sanitate tuenda, connects the excesses of 
motions connected with certain emotional responses ('desires, arguments and 
rages') with excess bile, and their deficiency with excess phlegm, and also 
mentions some further medical consequences of these, as well as lifestyle 
prescriptions to avoid them. 
The texts at Appendix 2 (C) and (D) give more pathological detail about 
emotional disturbances as provokers of disease, the former listing worry and 
rage amongst other drying causes, the latter offering a similar list - worry, rage 
and distress - amongst the causes of excess yellow bile. And we have rage as 
a cause of heating, in particular of the blood, at (E). Excess heat, in Galen's 
pathology, can lead to fever. It is here, surely, that we have the medical crux 
of the matter. Fever, a central disease category in Galenic medicine, 
represents the more serious end of the spectrum of these emotion-related 
outcomes; and this is borne out, too, by the frequency with which this 
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connection is made in Galen's medical works. Appendix 2 (F) gives a selction 
of texts from among the many instances where this phenomenon is described. 
Rage, anger, distress and worry are amongst causes that can contribute to 
the inception of fever. 
These texts, then, from Galen's medical works - works concerned with 
diseases, their classification, aetiology and diagnosis - describe the physical 
consequences of a range of emotional disturbances. We see that the 
particular emotional disturbances under discussion are intimately related to 
changes in, and particular manifestations of, heat, and so also to a set of 
related concepts: pneuma or breath, the heart, blood, drying, yellow bile and, 
potentially and most seriously, fever.  
 
Cases where emotional disturbance has had fatal consequences 
There are other texts which give an even stronger statement of the potentially 
dramatic effects of emotional disturbances, but without the same level of 
scientific explanation. These belong to a category which we might call either 
'case-history' or 'anecdote'. 
One of the main contexts for these is Galen's commentary on the Hippocratic 
Epidemics, book VI. Galen is commenting on an aphoristic sentence14 which 
contains the word gnōmē, which might here, at least in Galen's interpretation 
of it, be taken to mean something like 'mental state'. He devotes three long 
pages, pp. 485-7 of the CMG edition of Wenkebach and Pfaff, to this single 
word. So, he says - and I paraphrase the German translation here of a text 
that is only extant in Arabic: 
'Those who get angry at anything often fall because of this into sickness, 
which it is difficult to save them from. Many die not because of the bad state 
of their illness but because of the bad state of their soul and worry. So, I know 
a large number of people who have been overcome by fear of death, first 
made ill by it and then died of it. Sometimes a dream was the initial cause, 
sometimes a perceived sign.' 
    (Hipp. Epid. VI, vi, 485 Wenkebach-Pfaff) 
Specifically, there is the man from Mysia who worked as an augur, and saw a 
sign predicting his own death; he became distressed, yellow in colour, 
sleepless, worried; then started to have fevers, became confused in his mind; 
and died after two months (ibid., p. 486). Another became distressed, then 
feverish, sleepless and eventually deranged after a loss of money, also with a 
fatal result (ibid, p. 486). And then there was the literary man who lost his 
books in the same fire where Galen lost his; here again distress leads to 
sleeplessness, and then fever, and eventually death (ibid.,p. 486). This last 
                                                        
14
 Ἔθος, δὲ, ἐξ οἵων ὑγιαίνομεν, διαίτῃσι, σκέπῃσι, πόνοισιν, ὕπνοισιν, ἀφροδισίοισι, γνώμῃ 
(V.352,8-9 Littré).  
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account parallels that now found at De indolentia 7, which probably, indeed, 
refers to the same individual.15 
Though the detail is less physiologically specific in these anecdotes than in 
the texts which we have previously considered, the accounts seem in general 
consistent with what is said about fevers in those. In most of these brief 'case-
histories', fever is mentioned; some - such as the fearful account of the man 
whose fatal illness was caused by the inadvertent passing of wind in a public 
place - have 'wasting-away' without explicit mention of fever; but we can 
perhaps take it that this is the causal process implied. 
In all the above cases, then - both the more physiologically precise and the 
more anecdotal accounts - we have emotional disturbances seen as causes 
of medical illness, ranging from a slightly dried-out or overheated condition, 
through fever, to death. 
The significance of the mental here, then, is that it may have quite specific, 
and dangerous, physical consequences. A relevant summation of the 
phenomena that we have seen considering seems to be provided by another 
remark from De sanitate tuenda:  
'... one should not think that it is only the business of the philosopher to shape 
the character of the soul. Rather, it is his business to do it because of 
something greater, that is the health of the soul itself, while it is the doctor's 
business to do it so that the body does not readily fall victim to sickness.'  
... μὴ νομίζειν, ὡς φιλοσόφῳ μόνῳ προσήκει πλάττειν ἦθος ψυχῆς · ἐκείνῳ 
μὲν γὰρ δι᾽ ἕτερον τι μεῖζον τὴν τῆς ψυχὴς αὐτῆς ὑγείαν, ἰατρῷ δὲ ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ 
ῥᾳδίως εἰς νόσους ὑπομεταφέρεσθαι τὸ σῶμα.   (San. Tu. I.8, 
19,28-30 Koch, VI.40 Kühn) 
 
 
The pulse context and the focus on diagnosis   
So, much of Galen's interest in a certain kind of mental disturbance is 
medical; and this helps explain his interest in the physical correlates. It is 
important to know precisely what is going on physically in a particular mental 
state, because this is likely to have medical implications. The concern is not, 
here, with the control of anger, fear or anxiety considered in their own right: 
there is such a concern, and it is addressed in Aff. Pecc. Dig.; but that 
belongs as it were to a separate discourse. There, in an ethical treatise, 
ethical consequences, and particular ethical practices to correct the situation, 
are paramount, but the physical correlates and medical consequences are 
scarcely considered; in the medical texts which we have been considering, 
the reverse holds. 
                                                        
15
 4,6-8 Boudon-Millot and Jouanna: the person in question 'wasted away and died of 
depression' (ἀπὸ δυσθυμίας καὶ λύπης διεφθάρη συντακείς, Nutton's translation); on the 
probable identity of the two, and possible forms of the name, see Nutton, in Singer (2013), 79, 
n. 15, and cf. Boudon-Millot and Jouanna ad loc. 
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But a further corollary of this is that it may be important to diagnose from a 
physical state what has been going on mentally, for precisely the same 
reason.  
In this context, the close relationship of the pulse with the physical 
phenomena mentioned is of central importance. We have seen this to some 
extent in the texts already cited. It is, precisely, the condition of the heart, the 
innate heat and the blood that determine the pulse; the pulse thus gives us 
pretty much direct access to those emotional states which, as we have seen, 
are intricately connected with them. 
The passage already mentioned from De crisibus, Appendix 2 (F) (v), for 
example, which gives an account of the origin of a number of different kinds of 
fever, continues with an account of the effect that the diverse phenomena will 
have on the pulse:  
'I shall start ... from the soul-affections ... worry, fear, rage and distress. If 
these still remain when the examination takes place, you should try to make 
your diagnosis especially on the basis of the pulse ... But if they have ceased, 
but the disposition remains, you will find, even in the pulse, an unclear 
indicator of the affections that caused the fever, but the rest will be sufficient.'  
ἄρξομαι ... ἀπὸ τῶν ψυχικῶν παθῶν ... φροντίδος καὶ φόβου καὶ θυμοῦ καὶ 
λύπης. εἰ μὲν δὴ μενόντων ἔτι τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς παθῶν ἡ ἐπίσκεψις γένοιτο, διὰ 
τῶν σφυγμῶν μάλιστα πειρᾶσθαι διαγινώσκειν ... εἰ δ᾽αὐτὰ μὲν εἴη 
πεπαυμένα, μένοι δ᾽ἡ διάθεσις, ἀμυδρὸν μέν τι κᾀν τοῖς σφυγμοῖς εὑρήσεις 
γνώρισμα τῶν ποιήσαντων τὸν πυρετὸν παθῶν, ἀποχρήσῃ δέ σοι καὶ χωρὶς 
τῶν σφυγμῶν τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα. (De crisibus II.13, IX.696-7 Kühn) 
Specific relationships of particular affections of the soul to particular kinds of 
pulse - and the possibility of discerning the former from the latter - are given in 
the pulse treatises. 
'In rage the pulse is big, vigorous, fast and frequent ... In pleasure: big, 
infrequent, slow, but not unusual in vigour ... In distress: small, unclear, slow, 
infrequent ... In fear which is sudden and violent: quick, agitated, disordered, 
uneven; in fear that has been there for a while: like that in  distress. ... Pain, 
when it alters the pulse ... '  
θυμοῦ μὲν ὑψηλός ἐστιν ὁ σφυγμὸς καὶ μέγας καὶ σφόδρος καὶ ταχὺς καὶ 
πυκνός. ... ἡδονῆς δὲ μέγας καὶ ἀραιὸς καὶ βραδύς, οὐ μὴν σφοδρότητί γε 
διάφορος. ... λύπης δὲ μικρὸς καὶ ἀμυδρὸς καὶ βραδὺς καὶ ἀραιός. ... φόβου 
δὲ τοῦ μὲν ὑπογυίου καὶ σφοδροῦ ταχὺς καὶ κλονώδης καὶ ἄτακτος καὶ 
ἀνώμαλος, τοῦ δὲ ἤδη κεχρονισμένου οἷος ὁ τῆς λύπης. ... ἄλγημα δὲ τὸ 
τρέπον τοὺς σφυγμούς ... 
   (De causis pulsuum IV.2-6, IX.157-61 Kühn) 
The passage has been shortened in the interests of manageability; but one 
should note that most of the ellipses here correspond to quite detailed 
accounts of the physical processes that lead to these kinds of pulse in these 
cases. 
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Soul affections are among the things which can be distinguished by that most 
useful diagnostic tool, the pulse. And again, as we have seen in other 
contexts, these emotional disturbances are placed alongside physical ones as 
causes of the observed phenomenon.  
'But I find that high pulses arise in rage and before crises ... ' 
ἀλλ᾽ἐγὼ τοὺς μὲν ὑψηλοὺς ἔν τε τοῖς θυμοῖς καὶ πρὸ τῶν κρίσεων εὑρίσκω 
γινομένους ... 
     (De causis pulsuum II.13, IX.93 Kühn) 
This quotation is followed, on pp. 96-7, by an account of how and why the 
pulse is high in those in rage, even if their condition is faultless. 
As Galen emphasizes in a number of contexts, it is essential to successful 
diagnosis to have a clear conception of the natural state of the patient, against 
which to measure any departures from the norm. Such is the context of the 
next passage, from De praesagitione ex pulsibus: Galen spends some time 
discussing how one distinguishes acquired or temporary changes to the state 
of the body. 
 'That which arises from rage, too, occurs with vigour, and should not be 
impossible for an intelligent person to spot, if he observes the eyes and the 
whole face too. But in one who wishes to restrain and conceal his rage, the 
pulse becomes uneven; and it is even more uneven in in those experiencing 
anxiety and shame.'  
καὶ μέν γὲ καὶ ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ θυμοῦ μετὰ σφοδρότητος γίνεται, καὶ οὐδ᾽ἂν ἄλλως 
λάθοι τόν γε συνετὸν εἴς τε τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ τὸ σύμπαν πρόσωπον 
ἀποβλέποντα. κατέχειν μέντοι καὶ κρύπτειν βουλομένῳ τὸν θυμὸν ἀνώμαλος 
ὁ σφυγμὸς γίνεται καὶ μᾶλλον ἀνώμαλός ἐστιν τοῖς ἀγωνιῶσί τε καὶ 
αἰδουμένοις. 
   (De praesagitione ex pulsibus I.1, IX.214-15 Kühn)  
We notice here how rage is incorporated within a system of physical causes: 
there follows immediately after these lines an account of the effect on the 
pulse of semi-digested foods. 
 
The pulse in patients who are concealing something 
The reference here to concealed rage reminds us of a particular dimension of 
Galenic diagnosis: diagnostic tools can be used to get at information which 
the patient wishes to hide. It can, for example, be important to know whether a 
patient is self-medicating in the doctor's absence. The passage just quoted in 
fact proceeds to give just such an account. The question, in Galenic terms, is 
whether the increase in a patient's pulse was due to an access (episēmasia) 
of illness, a paroxysm, or whether it was due to his having taken a heating 
drug when Galen was not looking. Here, of course, precise technical 
knowledge - both in terms of the discernment of the pulse and in terms of the 
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expected course of a disease in such cases - must be used in conjunction 
with external considerations, in particular the habits and character of the 
patient: his ethos and ēthos.  
We are put in mind of the anecdotes (or 'case histories') from Galen's short, 
self-publicizing - as opposed to long and technical - work on such techniques: 
Prognosis. 
There, the well-known account of his encounter with the wife of Justus is 
precisely relevant to the specific diagnostic claims that we have been 
considering.16 Galen is called to the bedside of a woman whose known 
symptoms are sleeplessness and disturbed rest. He finds (presumably after 
taking a pulse, though this is not stated) that she has no fever, and that she is 
reluctant to answer any questions about the cause of her insomnia. On the 
basis of this first visit, he is left with two possibilities: that she has a 
melancholic depression or that she is distressed about something that she 
does not want to admit (ἢ μελαγχολικῶς δυσθυμεῖν ἤ τι λυπουμένην οὐκ 
ἐθέλειν ὁμολογεῖν, 102,1-2 Nutton, XIV.631 Kühn).  
It is, of course, the pulse that will enable him to complete the diagnosis 
conclusively (even if there is, admittedly, considerable external input, too - not 
just in the woman's reluctance to speak with or admit him, but also in a maid's 
confirmation that this is indeed a serious case of lupē, 102,9 Nutton, XIV.632 
Kühn). At a chance mention of the name of the dancer Pylades, Galen is able 
to observe the pulse, and finds it to have that uneven quality associated with 
disturbance of the soul, and anxiety in particular, that we have seen discussed 
(τὸν σφυγμὸν εὗρον ἀνώμαλον ... ὅστις δηλοῖ τὴν ψυχὴν τεθορυβῆσθαι · ὁ 
αὐτὸς οὖν καὶ τοῖς ἀγωνιῶσι ... συμβαίνει, 102,16-18 Nutton, XIV.632-3 
Kühn).  
Of course, as Galen pretty much admits, intelligent guess-work, alongside the 
introduction of external information, were necessary both here and in the 
subsequent examples he gives of the discovery of concealed causes: a 
steward who is worried at the prospect of having to render an account when 
he knows money is missing (102,29-104,8 Nutton, XIV.633-4 Kühn) and a boy 
who is surreptitiously eating food and thus sabotaging his recovery (104-110 
Nutton, XIV.635-641 Kühn). But they do further reinforce the claim that some 
kind of diagnostic techniques, in particular that of the pulse, can be used to 
discern - or at least to help guess at - such hidden causes. 
We have seen, then, a variety of contexts emphasizing the diagnostic 
dimension of the physical differences attendant on mental disturbance. It is 
this diagnostic dimension, I think, that gives us our best approximation to a 
clear answer to our original question. It would seem that such diagnostic 
possiblities lie at the heart of Galen's insistence on particular physical 
symptoms as the essence of the emotional disturbance. The emotional 
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 The account is at Praen. 6, 100,15-102,27 Nutton, XIV.631-3 K. A similar diagnostic 
success is attributed to Erasistratus, and mentioned both in this text (ch. 6, 100,7-14 Nutton, 
XIV.630-1 K.) and at Hipp. Epid. II, 208 Wenkebach-Pfaff; but Galen claims that the specific 
intellectual procedure he followed with the wife of Justus was his own. 
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disturbance that a patient undergoes is a matter of fact, and it is a fact to 
which the doctor, especially through the diagnostic tool of the pulse, has 
access. The doctor's knowledge of the fact is something that may then be of 
concrete significance for therapy. 
 
Models of the soul? 
We have looked at a number of emotional disturbances - pathē of the soul - 
which are discussed in detail in a variety of physiological and medical 
contexts, in a wide range of Galenic works. But here a problem arises. As we 
have already suggested in passing, there seems to be a striking lack of 
overlap between the kind of discussion of emotion that has been our main 
focus above - discussion in terms of heat, blood, pneuma, the heart, drying, 
yellow bile, fever - and those that appear in Galen's works purporting to give a 
dedicated discussion of the soul. There is, indeed, a work devoted specifically 
to  'affections of the soul' (Aff. Pecc. Dig.), and the terms of its discussion are 
quite different. 
What is perhaps most remarkable is that the discussions of mental or 
emotional states which we have been considering are conducted almost 
entirely without mention of the rational capacity, or the brain; and, more 
broadly, without reference to interaction between the parts of the soul. We 
seem to have, (1) on the one hand, a form of discussion of pathos which 
focuses on the nexus of concepts, thumos - heat - blood - the heart, and 
which involves almost no mention of the function of the brain, or, more 
generally of internal interaction within the Platonic tripartite soul; (2) on the 
other, a form of discussion of pathos which focuses on the thumoeidic (heart-
related) part of the soul mainly in terms of its relationship with the other parts, 
rational and desiderative, and which makes almost no mention of physical 
correlates. In this latter context, what are most prominent are the capacity of 
the thumoeidic to be educated by reason; its role in allying with reason 
against desire; and, more generally, the fundamental role of early training and 
education. Purely as a shorthand, let me for the moment refer to these two 
forms of discussion respectively as the medical and the philosophical 
discourse of the pathē. 
That apparent rift led Paola Manuli, in her ground-breaking and thought-
provoking work now nearly thirty years ago,17 to talk of the interference 
between different models in Galen. Her view was that thumos and other 
blood-related concepts belonged ultimately to a different model of 
explanation, with origins both in traditional Greek thought and in the medical 
tradition, and not readily or not successfully incorporated within the Platonic - 
and brain-centred - tripartite model which Galen adopts elsewhere. 
Such analysis is complex and problematic - not least so because of the 
compartmentalized, or, perhaps worse, partially compartmentalized, nature of 
Galenic discussions: he himself does not give us the assistance we might like 
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 See especially Manuli (1988); relevant also are Manuli (1986) and (1993).  
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in understanding how or to what extent his discussions in different contexts 
can be seen as belonging within a single model of explanation. 
Paola Manuli's approach is still, I think, worthy of consideration. It is also true, 
both that more work has been done in this area since 1988, and that more 
work needs to be done on a range of texts, in order to gve a clearer answer to 
the problem that she raised. But let us say a little more about that problem, 
and about possible approaches to it. 
If we consider the specific emotional disturbances that have been our focus 
above, worry (phrontis) and anxiety (agōnia) make very frequent appearances 
in medical contexts such as those that we have been considering; but they 
hardly appear at all in Aff. Pecc. Dig. There is no psychotherapy for anxiety, or 
worry - items which we might have expected to be fairly central to a 
psychotherapy. Other terms from our medical discourse, such as fear and 
distress, do, certainly, appear in the ethical works, Aff. Pecc. Dig., De 
indolentia and (as far as one can tell through Arabic) De moribus, but without 
any stress on the importance of their physical correlates. 
Galen could, of course, say that getting rid of excessive worry and anxiety - 
and indeed instances of fear too - will be the natural result of training the 
thumoeidic soul in the right way, and that this is precisely the focus of Aff. 
Pecc. Dig. and De moribus. That, in a sense, these are works addressed to 
giving the soul the right sort of training to avoid such disturbances ever arising 
- and so to avoid future medical consequences. But certainly, there are 
specific everyday psychical affections, phrontis and agōnia - ones which, we 
have seen, can have severe physical consequences - receive no direct 
psychotherapeutic prescriptions. 
Nor is this, as far as I can see, because Galen thinks that they can be 
addressed physically. The fact, elaborated above, that he insists on their 
physical correlates does not mean that they have a physical cure; rather, it 
means that one must be aware of them as potential causes of physical 
disease. 
If we turn to thumos, it is surely true that it is talked of in very different ways in 
the medical and philosophical discourses. There are psychotherapeutic 
prescriptions for it in the philosophical discourse, but not in the medical; 
conversely, in the philosophical discourse there is no discussion of its 
possible medical implications. More specifically, the function of the thumoeidic 
soul as allied with reason against desire seems not to be significantly 
reflected in the medical discourse. Indeed, it could be said, more generally, 
that the desiderative soul and its affections do not find physical correlates in 
Galen's medical discourse in anything like the same way that the thumoeidic, 
heart-related, one does. 
Can one characterize these differences as just a function of Galen's different 
focus in the different contexts? Or should one say, indeed, that in some sense 
different models are in play?  
As we have already suggested, evidence for the latter proposition might be 
seen in the particular conception of thumos in its specific relationship with 
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certain physical items - heart, blood, pneuma and innate heat - in the medical, 
but not the philosophical, discourse. (A possible counter to this perception 
would, perhaps, be to say that the works in the philosophical discourse simply 
do not need that level of physiological detail, and omit it as irrelevant.) 
The situation is, indeed, still more complex than has so far been allowed. For 
there is another set of 'soul affections' discussed in the medical discourse, in 
addition to the heart- or heat-related ones considered above. I am thinking 
here of a range of mental disturbances which are, again, connected with the 
aetiology of hot and cold, but where the most important bodily location within 
that aetiology is that of the the brain. In this case, then, as in the philosophical 
discourse, the rational capacity, or brain, is of central importance; but the 
description and management of these complaints, again, seem to have very 
little to do with the discourse on the health and rational training of the soul 
given in Aff. Pecc. Dig. and in De moribus.  
What is at issue here is the category of more serious mental aberrations, as 
distinct from the more everyday ones which we have looked at above. The 
discussion of this category is beyond my scope here, and indeed they would 
deserve a dedicated study in their own right:18 they include phrenitis, 
paraphrosunē, melancholia - serious disturbances of the rational or 
hegemonic capacity. The most detailed discussions of this category of 'brain 
malfunction' occur in Symp. Diff. and in Loc. Aff. As already stated, they 
depend in particular on states of hot and cold, especially as they affect the 
brain. Here, too, we may point out that their analysis does not involve any 
appeal to the notion of the tripartite soul (as of central importance in the 
philosophically-conceived soul pathology): what are being described are 
problems with a single part, the brain or the rational. 
Discussion in terms of heat, and of humours, seems absent from the 
philosophical works, just as the full tripartite Platonic scheme of explanation of 
soul affections seems absent from the works on pathology and the clinical 
context that we have been considering. 
On the other hand, Galen might, if pressed, argue that at least some of the 
differences in analysis are due to the different context - that, in fact, the 
discussions are in a continuum.  
Aff. Pecc. Dig. and De moribus, he could say, are, precisely, telling you how to 
deal with thumos and its relatives in their own right, and focussing in particular 
on the importance of early habituation and education in this context. The 
works on diseases and diagnosis are telling you about what happens if they 
are left untreated, or if there is poor early education, or of they are allowed to 
have physical consequences.  
He could, further, argue that at least distress, lupē, gets a specific treatment, 
with cognitive-therapy-style interventions, in De indolentia - a text which 
indeed, as we have seen, discusses not only that 'therapy of the word' but 
also, anecdotally, the terrible physical dangers of lupē not so treated. (This 
particular affection, moreover, has a prominence in Aff. Pecc. Dig. too, in a 
                                                        
18 But see now Devinant (forthcoming); Singer (forthcoming). 
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way which seems in a sense to take Galen outside the intellectual framework 
of Platonic tripartition.) He might further, as I've already suggested, say that 
other specific disturbances - shame, anxiety, worry and fear generally - come 
under the general heading of thumoeidic passions in the Platonic sense, and 
so will be controlled by the Platonically correct discipline of that part.  
And, what is more, he could point to at least one passage where he does 
indeed seem to give an account of the physical correlate of the interaction of 
reason and spirit as discussed in the works of moral psychology: see 
Appendix 1, where a part of the description of motions of the blood in De 
causis symptomatum (pp. 192-3) seems to do just that. (It would still have to 
be admitted, in this particular passage, that the three Platonic parts of the soul 
are not clearly identified, the distinction being between logismos and to 
pathētikon. This lack, indeed, seems to correspond to an absence of 
appearance of the Platonic epithumētikon in the medical-pathological 
contexts. The thumoeides seems to lend itself to detailed description within 
Galen's heart- and heat-based physiological system; desire, with its 
theoretical correlate of liver, much less so.) 
To return to the original question here, and to Paola Manuli's 'interference 
between different models', I still feel that her intuition is sound, though it 
perhaps needs to be restated in qualified form. That there are different 
(though overlapping) vocabularies, due in part to different intellectual 
traditions (Hippocratic, later medical, Platonic) seems clear; clear, too, that - 
to put it at its weakest - terms are deployed differently, creating different 
conceptual schemes and raising different kinds of problems and solutions, in 
different works.  
It also seems clear that Galen would probably have had some reply to make, 
if challenged, as to how his different works do belong within a single 
framework of explanation. 
 
Treatment - and physical basis - of mental disturbances 
We mentioned a little earlier that Galen does not suggest specific physical 
treatment for phrontis, agōnia, etc.; and that they do not feature - and least 
not clearly and explicitly - in his philosophical 'cognitive therapy' approach. 
What, then, if anything, does he suggest doing about them (apart, perhaps, 
from the broader approach in terms of educating the spirited part of the soul)? 
 
Reciprocal soul-body relations 
Before I discuss the point in detail, let me digress here briefly to talk about the 
direction of causation in Galen more generally - a digression which will to 
some extent function as a summary of some of the issues raised above. We 
have seen, amply attested, cases of mental disturbances having physical 
effects; and, as we know, in particular from Quod animi mores and PHP, 
physical mixtures and constitutions, and the central organs of the body, are of 
fundamental importance for the functioning of the soul. I do not think, in spite 
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of the well-known claims of QAM in their stronger statement, that a completely 
straightforward or univocal picture emerges from Galen's writing, on the 
causal relationship between physical and mental states.19 Of relevance here 
are passages, in QAM and elsewhere, which assert the reciprocal 
relationship, in particular the possibility of virtuous circles coming about in 
soul-body relations. 
' ... it is on the mixtures that depend, in the rational, different degrees of 
shrewdness and foolishness <and, in the non-rational part of the soul, well-
balanced or ill-balanced motions, also in different degrees>.20 And the 
mixtures themselves are consequent on the original formation and the well-
humoured daily regimes, and these things mutually increase each other. So, 
to be sure, people who become sharp-spirited21 because of the hot mixture 
then fire up their innate heat by their sharpness of spirit; and those who are 
well-balanced in their mixtures, having well-balanced motions of the soul, are 
assisted towards good humour.'  
ταῖς κράσεσι δ᾽ἕπεται κατὰ μὲν τὸ λογιστικὸν ἀγχίνοιά τε καὶ μωρία κατὰ τὸ 
μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον <κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἄλογον κινήσεις σύμμετροι ἢ ἄμετροι, καὶ 
ἐνταῦθα κατὰ τὸ μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἧττον>· αἱ κράσεις δ᾽αὐταὶ τῇ τε πρώτῃ γενέσει 
καὶ ταῖς εὐχύμοις διαίταις ἀκολουθοῦσιν, ὥστε συναυξάνειν ἄλληλα ταῦτα. διὰ 
γοῦν τὴν θερμὴν κρᾶσιν οἱ ὀξύθυμοι γιγνόμενοι ταύταις πάλιν ταῖς ὀξυθυμίαις 
ἐκπυροῦσι τὴν ἔμφυτον θερμασίαν · ἔμπαλιν δ᾽οἱ σύμμετροι ταῖς κράσεσι 
συμμέτρους τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς κινήσεις ἔχοντες εἰς εὐχυμίαν ὠφελοῦνται.    (QAM 
11,78-9 Müller, V.821 Kühn) 
We might digress at this point to attempt a summary on the question raised 
earlier in the paper, on the analysis of Galen's views in terms of the modern 
philosophy of mind. It seems to me (and I argue more fully elsewhere22) that 
Galen does not commit himself either to physicalism or to epiphenomenalism, 
in spite of remarks which seem to commit him to some version or relative of 
mind-brain identity in QAM: the argument that appears to do this has to be 
understood as posed in a particular argumentative context, rather than 
representing Galen's final position.  
Rather, passages such as that just quoted, taken in conjunction with some of 
those already discussed, especially from Appendix 2 below, which highlight 
the causative role of emotional disturbance in physical disease, suggest a 
picture which would more accurately be characterized as interactionist 
dualism. Certainly, passages such as that from De sanitate tuenda with which 
we started, as well as the fuller account from De causis symptomatum 
(Appendix 1) emphasize the regularity with which particular types of  'mental 
event' can be correlated with particular physical ones, and so suggest 
something like 'type identity'. In fact, however, Galen is not ultimately 
committed to an identity theory at all. (How could he be, when he explicitly 
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 On this point, especially in relation to the interpretation of QAM, see now Singer (2013), 
especially the introduction to QAM in that volume. 
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 On the text here, see Singer (2013) ad loc. 
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 Or 'quick to anger': the word, in relation to Galen's other terminology for anger, is discussed 
by von Staden (2011). 
22
 See Singer (2013), esp. introduction to QAM. 
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and consistently throughout his work refuses to commit himself on the specific 
question of the substance of the soul?23) 
Important to bear in mind, here, is that Galen is not, in fact, a philosopher of 
mind - let alone one with access to twentieth- or twenty-first-century 
philosophical terminology. Tempting though it is to venture upon an analysis 
of Galen's 'philosophy of mind', it is essential to remember that his aim - albeit 
he takes on and engages with the second-century philosophical debate at 
some level - is to present an intellectual account that makes sense of the 
complex medical and experiential phenomena in pragmatic terms, rather than 
one that aims primarily at philosophical definition.24 
I would add, though without space to justify the proposition, that this nuanced, 
pragmatic, enquiring  - if, admittedly, not always easy-to-pin-down - approach 
that emerges from the texts which we have been considering seems to me in 
fact one of the great strengths and attractions of Galen's writing. 
But I return to the question I posed a little earlier: how to cure anxiety and 
worry, to the extent that they are not dealt with in the works of moral 
psychology?  
As has doubtless emerged by now, there is no one work of Galen's, nor even 
a range of works, devoted specifically to medical psychopathology, and his 
answers to questions of causation, pathology, diagnosis and treatment in this 
area have to be gleaned from discussions, comments and remarks scattered 
across a wide range of works.  
Our best approximation to Galen's theory of the treatment of the kinds of 
psychic disturbance that we have been considering seems to be found in a 
few isolated remarks, in relation to specific case histories (case histories 
which in some cases have been doubted to be actual ones from his own 
experience), especially in his Commentaries on Hippocrates' Epidemics. 
As a set of guidelines for therapeutic practice, one might say that they do not 
amount to a great deal; it would, perhaps, conversely, be possible to put a 
positive gloss on this by saying that Galen adopts a commonsense, non-
doctrinaire approach. 
We have already come across some of these examples from the Epidemics 
Commentaries, in the context where we were considering the potentially fatal 
consequences of such mental states. What possibilities does Galen suggest 
for treating them before such dire consequences arise?  
First of all, Galen does show an interest in identifying the underlying anxiety, 
or other problem: what the patient says or does can be used as a tekmērion, 
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 On the consistency of this position, and for a summary of the passages in which it is stated, 
see Donini (2008) and now Singer (2013). (It appears, for example, in the lengthy passage in 
Appendix 1 below.) 
24
 On the Galen's attitude to philosophers, and to philosophy as a discipline, and on his 
problematic self-definition in relation to both, see now Singer (2014). 
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an evidence, of what is going on in the soul. Such a process is described in 
the Commentary on Epidemics I.25  
But what follows on from such identification? Well, as far as cases of 
someone being in love are concerned, the medical intervention seems to end 
with the revelation: what to do about it is, presumably, up to the parties 
involved, within the limitations given by their marital and social status, and so 
on. (Perhaps there was some therapeutic value, at least, in getting it out in the 
open.) 
In some cases of anxieties which take the form of an idée fixe, Galen does 
discuss not just the identification of the anxiety but its removal.  
'Therefore the doctor must make it business to know not just general 
tendencies of patient but things that affect his soul. For healing of a man 
whose cause of illness is in the soul can only be achieved through removal of 
the idée fixe, not through food and drink, baths, exercise and so on ...'  
The insistence on removal of the idée fixe, presumably by some kind of 
cognitive therapy, as against any thought of dietetic approaches, is interesting 
indeed, in the broader context of Galen's work. He does not, systematically, 
tell one how to go about this. 
He does, however, finally - and I fear these are the remarks most relevant to 
an answer to our question - give two anecdotal examples of how such an 
anxiety or idée fixe was removed by means of a trick played on the patient. 
In the Commentary on Epidemics II (208 Wenkebach-Pfaff), a doctor heals a 
patient who thinks she has swallowed a snake. The doctor pretends to go 
along with the delusion and gives her an emetic, throws a snake into the vomit 
surreptitiously at the moment that she throws up; and she is cured. (The 'cure' 
is not presented by Galen as his own, but attributed to Chrysippus, the 
teacher of Erasistratus.) 
The same passage also recounts another similar trick - attributed this time to 
Erasistratus himself. The physician has a consultation with a man who 
believes himself to have heard a dead man address him from a graveyard. 
Again pretending to subscribe to the reality of the patient's delusion, he 
responds: it was me I that addressed you from the graveyard. And I now 
refuse my help against your illness, just as you refused to come when I called 
to you on that occasion. 
Both of the above tricks, we note, are attributed to doctors of a distantly 
previous generation. (Perhaps, while acknowledging the success of such an 
approach, Galen did not feel able to make such intellectual charlatanry part of 
his repertory. Or perhaps, more seriously, the paucity of real examples is due 
to a paucity of real therapeutic experience of this kind on Galen's part.) 
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 See Hipp. Epid. I, III.1, 107 Wenkebach-Pfaff, XVIIA.213-14 Kühn ([sc. Hippocrates] εἰπὼν 
διανοήματα ... ἐδήλωσεν ... ἐκ τεκμηρίων εὑρισκόμενον πρᾶγμα. τεκμήριον δέ ἐστιν ὃ 
ἀποφθέγγονταί τε καὶ πράττουσιν οἱ κάμνοντες, ibid. 107,24-26 Wenkebach-Pfaff, XVIIA.213 
Kühn). 
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There is not much material, then, on specific psychotherapeutic techniques in 
the case of chronic delusions or derangements; but there is, certainly, the 
acknowledgement of a difficult and important realm which is not accessible to 
cure by diet or drug therapy. 
 
Anti-Stoic or anti-philosophical polemic 
I end with a rather more speculative and open-ended consideration. I raised at 
the beginning the question: whom does Galen have in his sights when he 
says rage is not defined as appetite for revenge? The cautious answer would 
be that it could be just about anyone in the philosophical tradition, since this 
was probably a pretty standard definition by late antiquity. There is some 
slight reason to associate what Galen says with the treatise by pseudo-
Andronicus on Affections (now believed to be a Stoic text), because the 
precise term used by Galen for revenge, antitimōrēsis, is the same as that 
which occurs in that text's definition, and subtly different from Aristotle's 
antilupēsis. But one would not want to base too much on what was very 
probably a widespread, rather than a school-based, use of terminology. 
But, more broadly, and of relevance to Galen's position in the intellectual 
market: there was a considerable discourse in moral psychology (largely but 
by no means exclusively Stoic) which was able to produce great subtlety in its 
discussion of individual psychic affections or pathē. The Affections of pseudo-
Andronicus indeed, with its long list of individual items, exemplifies that 
discourse. 
Galen is not interested in that complexity, and it is striking that in his own 
philosophical work on the pathē of the soul (Aff. Pecc. Dig. - and, as far as we 
can tell from what is a mutliated text, the same holds for De moribus), there is 
no great subtletly or sophistication in their description. (One may, for example, 
contrast the greater elaboration in this area that one finds in Plutarch, 
Epictetus or Marcus Aurelius26.) 
Galen seems uninterested in detailed description of emotions, considered in 
their own right, of the sort engaged in by some philosophers. Is his approach 
here in fact related to the phenomenon which we have been considering 
above, namely his insistence on physical correlates? In other words, is he 
only interested in soul affections that can - as suggested in the quotation with 
which we started - be analysed also in terms of what happens in the body? 
For this analysis, of course, Galen, unlike his intellectual rivals (especially, 
perhaps, those who happen to be Stoic philosophers) has all the intellectual 
tools. The simplicity of Galen's language of soul-affection - its extreme 
povertà lessicale, again, something that was already noted by Paola Manuli - 
is in stark contradistinction to the extreme classificatory subtley of which he is 
capable in other fields, for example the description of the pulse, the branches 
of health, diseases. 
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 For further discussion and exemplification of this point, see Singer (2013), 211. 
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In that realm, he seems to be saying, you can divide as finely as you like; in 
the realm of physical causation, disease and diagnosis - the realm that really 
matters - I have the finer distinctions. 
 
 
APPENDIX 1: DE CAUSIS SYMPTOMATUM ON EMOTIONAL 
DISTURBANCES 
 
'Indeed, the drive, both inwards and outwards, of the innate heat is amongst 
the primary and (as one might call them) most hegemonic motions; it arises 
upon many soul affections; and of course along with this motion pneuma and 
blood, too, are sometimes borne and dragged in towards the source, 
sometimes pushed outwards and poured. Well, to make a declaration on the 
substance of the soul itself might perhaps be bold, even in some other work; 
in the present one it is not only bold but also superfluous. Whatever it actually 
is, one of two things seems to be the case: that it uses pneuma, blood and the 
heat that is in both of them as the primary instruments for all its activities, or 
that it subsists in those things. And it it is possible to observe its motions 
manifestly in many other affections, but especially those of the soul. Fear and 
rage, to begin with: the former draws and drags in both the pneuma and the 
blood towards the [VII.192 Kühn] source, with a simultaneous cooling of the 
surface parts; the latter pushes outwards, pours and heats. But what is known 
as anxiety, being a composite of the two, is uneven in its motions. And, 
certainly, the pulses of the arteries and of the heart are smallest and slackest 
in those experiencing fear, largest and most violent in those experiencing rage 
and uneven in those experiencing anxiety. In shame, there occurs first a 
motion inward of the soul-capacity, but then a concerted return to the surface; 
if, then, it does not thus return, it is fear and not shame. For shame comes 
about suddenly, not because the soul-capacity is expecting any ill, but, as one 
might say, because of some inborn softness and timidity, whereby the soul-
capacity cannot endure the society of a much greater person, but is eager to 
run away and, if at all possible, be somewhere else. Because of this it only 
retreats to the depth, as though running away, without the cooling. When the 
reasoning-faculty urges on and encourages the emotive part of the soul - 
[VII.193 Kühn] that which experiences fear and shame - it returns and moves 
to the surface in a similar manner of motion to that involved in the recall of 
heat after cold bathing. In fear, however, where the reasoning-faculty is not 
urging on and encouraging the emotive part of the soul at all, the hot is being 
constantly and increasingly extinguished, so that some of these even 
experience rigor. And what they undergo in fear in a concerted way, this they 
undergo to a small extent in distress: these affections differ from each other in 
size and violence, not in their overall kind. Indeed, there have even been 
cases of death resulting from sudden fear, when a naturally weak little soul is 
seized by a strong affection and is all at once extinguished and choked. ... No 
one has ever died as a result of rage, since neither is the heat cooled down 
nor the tension dissolved; but some small-souled individuals have died 
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through great joy, as also through fear; for the soul-capacity does not move to 
the surface with both tension and boiling at once, [VII.194 Kühn] but, quite the 
contrary, it now dissolves and relaxes whatever tension it previously had; so, 
then it is dispersed when, having reached its maximal relaxation, it is borne 
towards the outside. Pain, which forces the soul to be moved in an opposite 
way, presents symptoms similar to the greatest fear. In such cases people 
lose colour, are cooled, experience rigor and tremor, small pulse and absence 
of pulse, and finally die in the same way as those who have been terrified. For 
in these latter, too, the innate heat retreats within to the source, being 
simultaneously both dissolved and cooled down. And since such affections 
can cause death, there is, surely, nothing remarkable if they also causing 
fainting - nor, then, should we be surprised if the symptoms consequent on 
fainting, in particular involuntary evacuation of excretions, also follow. ... So, 
when rigor supervenes upon humours which are both hot and biting, there is 
nothing remarkable in the fact that all the surface parts are all cooled down, 
as the soul-capacity swims down to the depth together with the blood.'  
ἔστι δή τις ἐκ τῶν πρώτων καὶ, ὡς ἂν εἴποι τις, ἡγεμονικωτάτων κινήσεων ἡ 
ἔσω τε καὶ ἔξω φορὰ τῆς ἐμφύτου θερμασίας, ἐπὶ πολλοῖς πάθεσι γιγνομένη 
ψυχικοῖς, ἅμα δ᾽αὐτῇ δηλονότι καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ τὸ αἷμα, ποτὲ μὲν ἔσω τε καὶ 
πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν φέρεται  καὶ συστέλλεται, ποτὲ δ᾽ἐκτὸς ἀποτείνεται καὶ χεῖται. 
αὐτῆς μὲν γὰρ τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν οὐσίαν ἴσως μὲν καὶ κατ᾽ἄλλην τινα πραγματείαν 
ἀποφήνασθαι τολμηρὸν, ἐν δὲ τῇ νῦν ἐνεστώσῃ πρὸς τῷ τολμηρῷ καὶ 
περιττόν. ἔοικε δ᾽οὖν ἥ τις ποτ᾽ἂν ᾖ, δυοῖν θάτερον, ἤτοι πρώτοις ὀργάνοις εἰς 
ἁπάσας τὰς ἐνεργείας χρῆσθαι πνεύματί τε καὶ αἵματι καὶ τῇ θερμασίᾳ τῇ κατὰ 
θάτερον καὶ συναμφότερον, ἢ ἐν αὐτοῖς τούτοις ὑπάρχειν. ἔνεστι δὲ ἐναργῶς 
θεάσασθαι τὰς κίνησεις αὐτῆς ἐν ἄλλοις τε πολλοῖς καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ψυχικοῖς 
πάθεσιν. αὐτίκα φόβος τε καὶ θυμός, ὁ μὲν εἴσω τε καὶ πρὸς τὴν [VII.192 
Kühn] ἀρχην ὑπάγει καὶ συστέλλει τό τε πνεῦμα καὶ τὸ αἷμα σὺν τῷ 
καταψύχειν τὰ ἐπιπολῆς, ὁ δὲ ἀποτείνει τε καὶ χεῖ καὶ θερμαίνει. τὸ δ᾽ἀγωνιᾷν 
ὀνομαζόμενον ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχον σύνθετον, ἀνώμαλόν ἐστι ταῖς κινήσεσι. καὶ 
τοίνυν καὶ οἱ σφυγμοὶ τῶν ἀρτηριῶν τε καὶ τῆς καρδίας μικρότατοι μὲν καὶ 
ἀτονώτατοι τοῖς φοβηθεῖσι, μέγιστοι δὲ καὶ σφοδρότατοι τοῖς θυμωθεῖσιν, 
ἀνώμαλοι δ᾽εἰσὶ τοῖς ἀγωνιῶσιν. ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς αἰδοῦς εἴσω μὲν πρῶτον ἡ κίνησις 
γίγνεται τῆς ψυχικῆς δυνάμεως, ἐπάνοδος δ᾽αὖθις ἀθρόα πρὸς τοὐκτὸς 
λαμβάνει · ὡς εἴγε μὴ ἐπανέρχοιτο, φόβος ἐστὶν, οὐκ αἰδώς. ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἰδὼς 
ἐξαίφνης γίγνεται, μηδὲν τῆς ψυχικῆς δυνάμεως προσδοκώσης κακὸν, ἀλλ᾽, 
ὡς ἂν εἴποι τις, ὑπὸ μαλακίας τε καὶ δειλίας συμφύτου, μὴ φερούσης 
ἀνθρώπου πολὺ κρείττονος ὁμιλίαν, ἀλλ᾽ἀποδρᾶναί τε καὶ εἰ οἷόν τ᾽ ἦν ἐκ 
ποδῶν γενέσθαι σπευδούσης. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μόνον ἀποχωρεῖ πρὸς τὸ βάθος, 
οἷον ἀποδιδράσκουσα χωρὶς τοῦ καταψύχεσθαι. τοῦ λογισμοῦ δ᾽ἐπεγείροντος 
καὶ παρορμῶντος τὸ παθητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς, [VII.193 Kühn] ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ 
φοβούμενόν τε καὶ αἰδούμενον, ἐπανέρχεταί τε καὶ κινεῖται πρὸς τὰ ἐκτὸς ἐν 
ὁμοίῳ μάλιστα τρόπῳ κινήσεως, ἐν οἵῳ περ ἂν ἐπὶ ψυχρολουσίᾳ θερμασίας 
ἐπανάκλησις γίγνηται. ἐν δέ γε τοῖς φόβοις, ἅτε μηδ᾽ ὅλως ἐπεγείροντός τε καὶ 
παρορμῶντος τοῦ λογισμοῦ τὸ παθητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀεὶ καὶ μᾶλλον 
κατασβέννυται τὸ θερμόν, ὥστε καὶ ῥιγοῦν ἐνίους αὐτῶν. ὅπερ δ᾽ἐν φόβοις 
ἀθρόως, τοῦτ᾽ἐν λύπαις κατὰ βραχὺ πάσχουσι, μεγέθει καὶ σφοδρότητι τῶν 
παθῶν, οὐχ ὅλῳ τῷ γένει διαφερόντων. καὶ τοίνυν ἀπέθανον, ἤδη τινὲς ἐπὶ 
φόβοις ἐξαφνιδίοις, ὅταν ἀσθενὲς φύσει ψυχάριον ἰσχυρῷ πάθει κατασχεθὲν 
 29 
ἀθρόως κατασβεσθῇ τε καὶ καταπνιγῇ. ... θυμωθεὶς δ᾽οὐδεὶς ἀπέθανεν, ὡς ἂν 
μήτε τῆς θερμότητος καταψυχομένης μήτε τοῦ τόνου λυομένου · χαρέντες 
μέντοι μεγάλως ἔνιοι τῶν μικροψθχῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπέθανον, ὥσπερ καὶ 
φοβηθέντες · οὐ γὰρ ἅμα τόνῳ καὶ ζέσει κινεῖται πρὸς τὰ ἐκτὸς ἡ ψυχικη 
[VII.194 Kühn] δύναμις, ἀλλ᾽αὐτὸ τοὐναντίον, εἴ τι καὶ πρότερον εἶχε τόνου, 
τοῦτο νῦν ἐκλύει τε καὶ χαλᾷ · διαφορεῖται τοιγαροῦν, ὅταν ἐπιπλεῖστον 
χαλασθεῖσα φέρηται πρὸς τὸ ἐκτός. ὁ δὲ πόνος ἐναντίως κινεῖσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν 
ἀναγκάζων ὅμοια τῷ μεγίστῳ φόβῳ φέρει τὰ συμπτώματα. καὶ γὰρ ἀχροοῦσι 
κὰι καταψύχονται καὶ ῥιγοῦσι καὶ τρέμουσι καὶ μικροσφυκτοῦσι καὶ ἀσφυκτοῦσι 
κὰι τέλος ἀποθνῄσκουσιν ὡσαύτως τοῖς ἐκπλαγεῖσιν. ὑποφεύγει γὰρ κᾀν 
τούτοις ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἡ ἔμφυτος θερμασία λυομένη θ᾽ἅμα καὶ 
κατασβεννυμένη. ὅπου δὲ θάνατον ἐπιφέρει τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν παθῶν, οὐδὲν 
δήπου θαυμαστὸν εἰ καὶ λειποψυχίαν. οὔκουν οὐδ᾽ὄτι τὰ λειποψυχίας 
συμπτώματα, τά τε ἄλλα καὶ ἡ ἀκούσιος ἔκκρισισ τῶν περιττωμάτων ἕπεται 
οὐδὲν ἔτι χρὴ θαυμάζειν. ... ὅταν οὖν ἐπὶ θερμοῖς τε ἅμα καὶ δακνώδεσι χυμοῖς 
γίνηται ῥῖγος, οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν ἐστι καταψύχεσθαι τὰ ἐκτὸς ἅπαντα, τῆς 
ψυχικῆς δυνάμεως εἰς τὸ βάθος συννεούσης ἅμα τῷ αἵματι.  
     (Caus. Symp. II.5, VII.191-4 K.) 
 
APPENDIX 2: Emotional disturbances as causes of physical disease 
(A) 'There are also baths, rages, worries, distress and all such things which 
pretty nearly transform the mixture through their every shift.'  
καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἔτι καὶ λουτρὰ καὶ θυμοὶ καὶ φροντίδες καὶ λῦπαι καὶ 
πάνθ᾽ὅσα τοιαῦτα μονονουχὶ καθ᾽ἑκάστην ῥοπὴν ὑπαλλάττοντα τὴν κρᾶσιν. 
    (San. Tu. I.5, 14,18-20 Koch, VI.28 Kühn) 
(B) 'Unbalanced motions within desires, arguments and rages make the 
animal more bilious, when they are excessive, and more phlegmatic and 
colder when they are deficient. Moreover, in the former conditions fevers and 
those affections which are hotter come about, in the latter, obstructions in the 
liver and internal organs, and epilepsy and apoplexy and anything else of that 
sort - to summarize, all diseases involving catarrh and flow. And we have 
restored health to people who were suffering for many years because of the 
character of their soul, by correcting the imbalance of the motions. ... 
[particular musical and exercise prescriptions are mentioned for] people in 
whom the motions of the spirited had become too vigorous and rendered the 
mixture of the body hotter than it ought to be should be ...  
αἱ δ᾽ἄμετροι κινήσεις ἐν ἐπιθυμίαις τε καὶ διαλογισμοῖς καὶ θυμοῖς, αἱ μὲν 
ὑπεβάλλουσαι χολωδέστερον ἀποφαίνουσι τὸ ζῷον, αἱ δ᾽ἐλλείπουσαι 
φλεγματικώτερον καῖ ψυχρότερον. καὶ δὴ καὶ ταῖς μὲν προτέραις ἕξεσιν οἵ τε 
πυρετοὶ καὶ ὅσα θερμόετερα πάθη, ταῖς δ᾽ἑτέραις ἐμφράξεις καθ᾽ἧπάρ τε καὶ 
σπλάγχνα, ἐπιληψίαι τε καὶ ἀποπληξίαις ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἄλλο, καὶ συνελόντα 
φάναι, τὰ καταρροϊκά τε καὶ ῥευματικὰ νοσήματα συμπίπτει πάντα. καὶ οὐκ 
ὀλίγους ἡμεῖς ἀνθρώπους νοσοῦντας ὅσα ἔτη διὰ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος ὑγιεινοὺς 
ἀπεδείξαμεν, ἐπανορθωσάμενοι τὴν ἀμετρίαν τῶν κινήσεων. ... οἷς αἱ τοῦ 
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θυμοειδοῦς κινήσεις σφοδρότεραι γενόμεναι θερμότεραν τοῦ δέοντος 
ἀπειργάζοντο τὴν κρᾶσιν τοῦ σώματος ... 
    (San. Tu. I.8, 20,4-17 Koch, VI.41 Kühn) 
 
(C) The drying effect of emotional disturbances 
'... having been dried out by insomnia, worry, sex, foods, a drying drug, or 
rage ...'  
ἐξηρασμένους ἢ ὑπὸ ἀγρυπνίας, ἢ φροντίδος, ἢ ἀφροδισίων, ἢ βρωμάτων, ἢ 
φαρμάκου ξηραίνοντος, ἢ θυμοῦ        
   (De marcore 2, VII.690 Kühn) 
 
(D) Emotional disturbances generate yellow bile 
The leek-green substances are generated in the digestive cavity only by 
individuals who have performed coction badly. And indeed, worry, rage, 
distress, exertion, exercise, sleeplessness, fasting and deficiency cause the 
accumulation of more of the humour of yellow bile in these people, because 
they also generate more of it in the liver.  
τὰ δὲ πρασοειδῆ μόνοις τοῖς κακῶς ἐν τῇ κοιλίᾳ γεννᾶται. καὶ μὲν μὲν δὴ καὶ 
φροντίδες καὶ θυμοὶ καὶ λῦπαι καὶ πόνοι καὶ γυμνάσια καὸ ἀγρυπνίαι καὶ 
ἀσιτίαι καὶ ἔνδειαι πλείονα τὸν τῆς ξανθῆς χολῆς τούτοις ἀθροίζουσι χυμόν, ὅτι 
καὶ πλείονα γεννῶσιν ἐν ἥπατι.  (De temperamentis II.6, 78,6-11 Helmreich, 
I.633 Kühn) 
 
(E) Emotional disturbances as causes of heating 
 
'This has all been distinguished in the study of the pulse; it will be enough for 
now to say that blood becomes wetter than it was in idleness, wet diet, 
through excess of watery residues; but as a result of rage and exercises, 
excess heat and massages, a heating drug, nourishment of that kind, and 
wines of the older, less controlled type, it becomes hotter ...'  
 
διῄρηται δὲ ἐν τῇ περὶ τῶν σφυγμῶν πραγματείᾳ τὰ τοιαῦτα σύμπαντα · νῦν 
δὲ ἀρκέσει τό γε τοιοῦτον εἰπεῖν, ὡς ἐξ ἀργίας μὲν καὶ διαίτης ὑγρᾶς 
ὑγρότερον ἑαυτοῦ γένοιτ᾽ἂν τὸ αἷμα, πλενοεξίᾳ τῶν ὑδατωδῶν περιττωμάτων 
· ἐπὶ θυμῷ δὲ  καὶ γυμνασίοις, ἐγκαύσεσί τε καὶ τρίψεσι, καὶ φαρμάκῳ 
θερμαίνοντι, καὶ τροφῇ τοιαῦτῃ, καὶ οἴνοις ἀκρατεστέροις καὶ παλαιοτέροις 
θερμότερον ... 
       (De plenitudine 11, VII.579 Kühn) 
 
'... in another manner the uneven bad-mixture will involve the whole body, 
sometimes through the retention of a smoky transpiration, sometimes from too 
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much exercise, or increase in exertions, which extend the heat, and 
sometimes as a result of rage, where the blood boils in an immoderate way, 
or through some excess heat, when it is heated from without ...  
 
... κατ᾽ἄλλον τρόπον ἀνώμαλος ἔσται δυσκρασία περὶ σύμπαν τὸ σῶμα, ποτὲ 
μὲν λιγνυώδους διαπνοῆς ἐπισχεθείσης, ποτὲ δὲ ἐκ γυμνασίων πλειόνων, ἢ 
πόνων αὐξηθέντων, τὴν θερμασίαν ἐπιτεινόντων, ποτὲ δὲ ἐπὶ θυμῷ, ζέσαντος 
ἀμετρότερον τοῦ αἵματος, ἢ δι᾽ἔγκαυσίν τινα, ἔξωθεν ἐκθερμανθέντος ...  
      (De inaequali intemperie 7, VII.747 Kühn) 
 
(F) Emotional disturbances as causes of fever 
(i) 'For, indeed, rage, weeping, anger, distress, worry which is more than it 
should be, as well as significant insomnia arising from them set off fevers, and 
become the starting-points of major diseases, as, too, conversely, an idle 
intellect, mindlessness and a soul which is completely lacking in spirt often 
bring about lack of colour and lack of nourishment through feebleness of the 
innate heat.'  
καὶ γὰρ θυμὸς καὶ κλαυθμὸς καὶ ὀργὴ καὶ λύπη καὶ πλεῖον τοῦ δέοντος φροντὶς 
ἀγρυπνία τε πολλὴ ἐπ᾽αὐτοῖς γενομένη πυρετοὺς ἀνάπτουσι καὶ νοσημάτων 
μεγάλων ἀρχαὶ καθίστανται, ὥσπερ καὶ τοὐναντίον ἀργὴ διάνοια καὶ ἄνοια καὶ 
ψυχὴ παντάπσιν ἄθυμος ἀχροίας καὶ ἀποτροφίας ἐργάζεται πολλάκις 
ἀρρωστίᾳ τῆς ἐμφύτου θερμότητος. 
   (San. Tu. I.8, 19,31-20,1 Koch, VI.40 Kühn) 
(ii) 'Someone who has engaged in immoderate exercise suffers fatigue. This 
is the same as having immoderate heat, beyond what is natural, in the joints 
and in the muscles. ... And if the warmth stays there and is dissipated before 
taking over the whole body, the result will be merely fatigue; but if it extends 
through whole body, the disease is called 'fever', this being an immoderate 
heat of the whole animal. So too rage, which is a boiling of the hot around the 
heart, sometimes, if it takes over the whole body because of an immoderate 
motion, sometimes gives rise to fever.' 
γυμνασθεὶς μέν τις ἀμετρότερον ἐκοπώθη. τοῦτο δ᾽ἐστὶ θερμασίαν ἔχειν 
ἄμετρον ἐν τοῖς ἄρθροις τὲ καὶ τοῖς μυσὶ πλείονα τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν. ... καὶ εἰ μὲν 
ἐνταῦθα καταμείνειεν ἡ θέρμη καὶ φθάσειεν λυθῆναι, πρὶν ἐπινείμασθαι 
σύμπαν τοῦ ζῴου τὸ σῶμα, κόπος ἂν οὕτω γε μόνον εἴη τὸ γεγονός · εἰ δὲ εἰς 
ἅπαν ἐταθείη τὸ σῶμα, πυρετὸς ὀνομάζεται τὸ νόσημα, τοῦ παντὸς ζῴου 
θερμότης τις ἄμετρος οὖσα. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ὁ θυμός, ζέσις τις ὢν τοῦ περὶ τὴν 
καρδίαν θερμοῦ, διὰ κίνησιν ἄμετρον ὅλον ἐπινειμάμενος ἐνίοτε τὸ σῶμα 
πυρετὸν ἀνῆψε.  (De causis morborum 2, VII.4 Kühn) 
 
(iii) 'This much is already evident to all, on the basis of the manifest facts: that 
some are observed to suffer fever as a result of rage, distress, excess heat or 
chilling, insomnia, failure to digest, drinking, or excess fulness.' 
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ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ κόποις, καὶ θυμοῖς, καὶ λύπαις, ἐγκαύσεσί τε καὶ ἐμψύξεσι, καὶ 
ἀγρυπνίαις, καὶ ἀπεψίαις, καὶ μέθαις, καὶ πλησμοναῖς, ὁρῶνται πυρέττοντες 
ἔνιοι, πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ἐστὶν ἤδη τοῦτό γε πρόδηλον, ὑπ᾽αὐτῆς τοῦ 
πράγματος τῆς ἐναργείας δεδιδαγμένοις.  
    (De differentiis febrium I.3, VII.279 Kühn) 
  
(iv) 'And rage is as it were a boiling and vigorous motion of the spirited 
capacity which is seated in the actual body of the heart. With this is 
simultaneously heated sometimes the substance of the pneuma, sometimes 
that of the blood, and if the receiving bodies happen to be in a favourable 
state for the retention of the heat for an extended period ... these remain 
unnaturally hot, and in this case the person necessarily suffers fever. ... But 
that fever which takes place as a result of distress is not has as its source not 
boiling, but only motion; that as a result of fatigue also has as its source larger 
motion of muscles, nerves, ligaments and joints: these are heated primarily, 
but the heat is transmitted from there to the heart by the connection, and in 
this process they suffer fever.'   
ὁ δέ γε θυμὸς οἷον ζέσις τις καὶ κίνησις σφοδρὰ τῆς θυμοειδοῦς δυνάμεως ἐν 
τῷ σώματι τῆς καρδίας αὐτῷ καθιδρυμένης. συνεκθερμαίνεται δὲ αὐτῇ ποτὲ 
μὲν ἡ τοῦ πνεύματος, ἔστιν ὅτε δὲ ἡ τοῦ αἵματος οὐσία, καὶ ἢν ἐιπτηδείως 
ἔχοντα τύχῃ πρὸς τὰ δεξάμενα κατασχεῖν ἐπὶ πολὺ τὴν θερμότητα ... διαμένει 
ταῦτα παρὰ φύσιν θερμά, κᾂν τῷδε πυρέττειν ἀνάγκη τὸν ἄνθρωπον. ... ὁ δὲ 
ἐπὶ λύπαις οὐκέτι ζέσιν, ἀλλὰ κίνησιν μόνον · ὁ δ᾽ἐπὶ κόποις, ἀρχὴν μὲν καὶ 
αὐτὸς ἔχει κίνησιν πλείονα μυῶν καὶ νευρῶν καὶ συδέσμων καὶ ἄρθρων, ἃ δὴ 
καὶ πρῶτα θερμαίνεται, διαδίδοται δὲ κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς ἐντεῦθεν εἰς τὴν 
καρδίαν ἡ θερμασία, κᾂν τοῦτῳ πυρέττουσιν.  
    (De differentiis febrium I.4, VII.283-4 Kühn) 
(v) 'The causes of generation of them [sc. fevers] are: insomnia, failure to 
digest, distress, fear, rage, worry, excess heat, chilling, fatigue and drinking 
and all those sorts of thing. How to discern these ... I shall explain: in common 
to all of them, the pulse increases in speed and frequency ...'  
αἱ προφάσεις δ᾽αὐτῶν τῆς γενέσεως ἀρυπνία καὶ ἀπεψία καὶ λύπη καὶ φόβος 
καὶ θυμὸς καὶ φροντίς, ἔκκαυσίς τε καὶ ψύξις καὶ κόπος καὶ μέθη καὶ πάνθ᾽ὅσα 
τοιαῦτα. πῶς οὖν γνωρίζειν ... διείμι · κοινῇ μὲν ἁπάντων ὁ σφυγμὸς εἰς τάχος 
ἐπιδίδωσι καὶ πυκνότητα ...       
 (De crisibus II.13, IX.696 Kühn) 
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